Anderson v. Smith, 2026 IL 131714 (June 25, 2026)
When does a lawsuit cross the line from a genuine claim into a tool for silencing someone who
spoke up at a public hearing?
On June 25, 2026, the Illinois Supreme Court gave courts a
clearer way to answer that question under the state’s Citizen Participation Act (735 ILCS 110/1
et seq.) — Illinois’s anti-SLAPP law.
The short version: what matters is the plaintiff’s purpose in suing, not a checklist asking whether
the case is “meritless and retaliatory.” The Supreme Court said the second prong of the anti-
SLAPP analysis requires courts to determine “the plaintiff’s subjective intent in bringing the suit,”
rather than apply the rigid First District formulation that requires a defendant seeking the
protections of the Citizen Participation Act to prove the suit was both “meritless” and
“retaliatory.” Anderson v. Smith, 2026 IL 131714, ¶ 34.
What is a SLAPP?
A SLAPP — a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation — is a suit filed not necessarily to
win in the ordinary sense, but to silence critics and watchdogs with the cost, delay, and
distraction of litigation for exercising constitutionally protected political or petitioning rights. The
Court reiterated that SLAPPs employ “the threat of monetary damages and/or substantial
defense costs to either deter individuals from exercising their political rights or to punish them
for doing so.” ¶ 15.
Illinois enacted the Citizen Participation Act in 2007 to give targets of these suits a fast exit: an
early motion to dispose of the claim, a stay of discovery, a 90-day deadline for the court to rule,
and attorney fees for the prevailing movant. The Act sets out its purposes in section 5, including
balancing “the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury” with “the constitutional rights of
persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government.” 735
ILCS 110/5; ¶ 15.
How the case arose
The dispute in Anderson traces back to a 2017 press conference in a park, held before a public
hearing on a proposed hog-farming operation. Nicholas Anderson supported the measure;
Meagan Smith opposed it and stood holding a sign reading “farms, yes; factory farms, no.”
When Anderson approached her, Smith said, “I don’t know you” and “don’t touch me.” ¶ 3.
Smith told police Anderson had pushed her, and Anderson was arrested and later charged with
battery. He was acquitted after a bench trial in 2019. Anderson then sued Smith for defamation
and malicious prosecution. Smith counterclaimed and moved to dispose of Anderson’s suit
under the Act, arguing it was a SLAPP aimed at punishing her for opposing the hog farm and
reporting what she believed was a crime.
The trial court denied her relief, and the case worked its way up on the question of what legal
standard governs.
The split the Court resolved
Illinois courts apply a three-part, post-Sandholm test. The dispute in Anderson centered on the
second prong — whether the plaintiff’s claims are solely based on, related to, or in response to
the defendant’s participation in government.
The First District read the Supreme Court’s earlier Sandholm decision to require defendants
seeking the protections of the Citizen Participation Act to prove a suit was both “meritless” and
“retaliatory.” The Fourth District rejected that approach, calling instead for a “true goal” inquiry
into the plaintiff’s intent.
The Supreme Court sided largely with the Fourth District, holding that the “meritless and
retaliatory” standard “does not accurately reflect the Act and controlling precedent.” ¶ 1. The
Court explained that Sandholm merely used the phrase “meritless, retaliatory SLAPP” lawsuits
“as adjectives to describe SLAPPs, rather than as elements that a movant must prove.” ¶ 25.
Despite that clarification, the real question is subjective: is the true goal of the lawsuit to chill
participation in government, rather than to recover for genuine personal harm? The Supreme
Court framed the movant’s burden as requiring proof that: “the true goal of the lawsuit is to ‘chill participation in government or to stifle
political expression,’ rather than to seek damages for personal harm from the
defendants’ tortious acts.” ¶ 26.
How to bring a motion to dispose under the Act
The Act does not create a new, freestanding motion. A movant raises the Act’s immunity “in any
pleading filed to dispose of a judicial claim” — in practice, a motion to dismiss. 735 ILCS 110/10,
15. Because immunity under the Act is an “affirmative matter” that defeats the claim, the
Supreme Court has held that the proper vehicle is a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9)
of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9). The relief may also be sought within a
summary judgment motion, as the defendant did in Anderson.
Three features make the motion powerful, and each should shape how you draft and time the
filing:
• Fast track. The trial court must hold a hearing and rule on the motion within 90 days
after the respondent is given notice. 735 ILCS 110/20(a).
• Discovery freezes. Filing the motion suspends discovery; the court may permit only
limited discovery on whether the movant’s acts are immunized. 735 ILCS 110/20(b).
• A movant-friendly burden. If the movant shows that its acts were in furtherance of
participation in government and that the plaintiff’s claims are solely based on those acts,
the court must grant the motion and dismiss the claim unless the respondent produces
clear and convincing evidence that the acts are not immunized. 735 ILCS 110/20(c).
Two more points worth building into strategy. The Act is to be “construed liberally to effectuate
its purposes and intent fully.” 735 ILCS 110/30(b). And fees are not discretionary for a prevailing
movant: “The court shall award a moving party who prevails in a motion under this Act
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” 735 ILCS 110/25.
Finally, the denial of a motion under the Act is not the end of the road before trial. A party may
seek a permissive interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to dispose under the Act.
Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(9).
Two practical takeaways
A meritorious claim can still be a SLAPP
Because the focus of a Motion to Dismiss under Anderson must now be the purpose of the suit
and not necessarily its legal strength, a claim that could theoretically win on the merits may still
be dismissed — but only if the defendant carries the difficult burden of showing the plaintiff sued
solely to deter or punish participation in government. The Court said so directly: “A claim that
could theoretically succeed on the legal merits may therefore still be dismissed as a SLAPP,”
but only if the defendant shows the plaintiff brought it “solely to deter or punish the defendant for
participation in government.” ¶ 31.
Familiar signals like the timing of the suit or damages wildly disproportionate to the alleged harm
can still inform that intent, but they are no longer required elements. Likewise, whether a
complaint is legally weak may bear on the plaintiff’s intent, but “it is not a prerequisite to
satisfying the second prong of the test.” ¶ 31.
No evidentiary hearing
Here the Court parted ways with the appellate court. Trial judges must decide these motions on
the pleadings and supporting documents — including depositions taken before discovery was
stayed — not through a fact-finding evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing, the Court
reasoned, “is contrary to the Act’s suspension of discovery and its 90-day timeframe for a trial
court to rule on the motion.” ¶ 28. Instead, “the trial court must determine the plaintiff’s
subjective intent in bringing the suit from the pleadings and other supporting documents.” ¶ 30.
That matters procedurally. The motion is reviewed de novo, and if a genuine dispute over the
plaintiff’s intent remains on that record, the defendant has not met the burden and the motion
must be denied with prejudice.
The 2025 amendments change the focus going forward
There is an important catch to everything above: Anderson interprets the version of the Act that
applies to cases filed before January 1, 2026. The General Assembly has since rewritten the
very parts of the Act that Anderson relied on. Public Act 104-431 (eff. Aug. 21, 2025) amended
the Act and added a new applicability provision, but the changes reach only actions commenced
on or after January 1, 2026. 735 ILCS 110/32. The Court flagged this itself, limiting its analysis
to “cases filed before January 1, 2026” and noting the amendments are “inapplicable to the case
before us.” ¶ 1 & n.1. For those earlier cases, the purpose-focused analysis described above
still controls.
For newer cases, the amendments take aim at the very thing Anderson made central — the
plaintiff’s intent. Anderson built the second prong on two ideas drawn from Sandholm: that the
claim had to be “solely” based on the defendant’s protected acts, and that the court had to find
the plaintiff’s subjective “true goal” in suing. The amended Section 15 removes both. It now
states that a claim “does not need to solely pertain to the moving party’s constitutional rights”
and that the Act “applies regardless of the motives of the person who brought the claim.” 735
ILCS 110/15 (as amended by Pub. Act 104-431).
That reorients the motion. Rather than asking why the plaintiff sued — the subjective inquiry at
the heart of Anderson — a court applying the amended Act asks the more objective question
whether the claim is based on, relates to, or is in response to the defendant’s protected activity,
regardless of the plaintiff’s motive. In practice, that is an easier showing for the movant and
should make dismissal more readily available.
The amendments expand the Act in two other ways worth noting. They extend its protection to
“freedom of the press” (735 ILCS 110/15) — a response to earlier decisions that had read the
Act not to reach general news reporting — and they stay “all other proceedings,” not just
discovery, once a motion is filed.
What the amendments do not appear to change is how the motion is decided. They leave
Section 20’s machinery in place, so Anderson’s procedural rulings — that the motion is resolved
on the pleadings and supporting documents, without an evidentiary hearing, and reviewed de
novo — should carry forward. In short, the how of the motion looks stable; it is the focus of the
second prong that shifts, from the plaintiff’s purpose to the objective reach of the claim. One
caution: the amended Act is clearer about what the test is not (motive-based) than about the
framework that replaces it, so courts will need to fill in the contours, and it may take several
rounds of litigation before the post-2026 standard settles.
Bottom line
Anderson v. Smith shifts the Illinois anti-SLAPP inquiry away from a rigid “meritless and
retaliatory” formula and toward a focused look at why the plaintiff really sued — decided on the
papers, quickly, and reviewed fresh on appeal. Keep the dividing line in mind: that purpose-
focused analysis governs cases filed before January 1, 2026, while the 2025 amendments steer
later suits away from the plaintiff’s motive altogether. For anyone weighing a defamation or
related claim that touches on an opponent’s public advocacy, knowing which version of the Act
applies is now the first question to ask.
This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. For guidance on a specific matter, consult a licensed attorney.