Storm & Piscopo, P.C.Storm & Piscopo, P.C.2026-08-05T04:49:42Zhttps://www.stormpiscopo.com/feed/atom/WordPress/wp-content/uploads/sites/1204259/2025/04/cropped-SP_FAV-32x32.pngOn Behalf of Storm & Piscopo, P.C.<![CDATA[Minority Shareholder Rights in Illinois: 5 Protections You Didn’t Know You Had]]>https://www.stormpiscopo.com/?p=491472026-08-05T04:49:42Z2026-08-05T04:49:42ZBeing a minority shareholder in an Illinois corporation can feel like being stuck in the in the back seat with no say in what direction the car is headed, while someone else controls the steering wheel. It may seem like you have little power against the majority shareholders who call the shots. The truth is far different. Illinois law provides robust protections for minority shareholders that can level the playing field in surprising ways.
You are not just along for the ride
Too many minority shareholders accept unfavorable treatment because they simply do not know their rights. Whether you own 5% or 45% of a company, Illinois corporate law grants you specific protections designed to prevent oppression and ensure fair treatment. Understanding these rights transforms you from a passive investor into an empowered stakeholder. Here are five worth knowing:
1. Dissenters’ rights during mergers and major transactions
When a corporation pursues a merger or sale, majority shareholders cannot simply force you to accept terms you find unfavorable. Illinois law grants you “dissenters’ rights” (also called appraisal rights), which allow you to demand fair cash value for your shares instead of accepting the transaction terms. This protection helps to better ensure you are not trapped in a deal that undervalues your investment.
2. The right to inspect corporate books and records
Voting trust agreements filed with the corporation
This access is not unlimited — you must have a proper purpose related to your interest as a shareholder. However, this right prevents majority shareholders from operating in complete secrecy and allows you to identify potential mismanagement or self-dealing.
3. Protection against oppressive conduct
Illinois courts recognize that majority shareholders owe duties to minority investors. If majority shareholders engage in “oppressive” conduct — actions that substantially defeat your reasonable expectations as an investor — you may petition the court for relief, including a forced buyout of your shares at fair value. For most privately held Illinois corporations, this remedy comes from Section 12.56 of the Business Corporation Act, which gives courts a broad menu of relief — including that buyout — when those in control act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent.
4. Derivative lawsuit rights
When corporate leadership harms the company through misconduct, you can file a derivative lawsuit on behalf of the corporation. This powerful tool allows you to hold directors and officers accountable for breaches of fiduciary duty, fraud, or mismanagement even when majority shareholders refuse to take action.
5. Preemptive rights and dilution protection
If your corporation was formed before January 1, 1982 — or if its articles of incorporation expressly grant preemptive rights — you may be entitled to purchase new shares before they are offered to outsiders. For corporations formed on or after that date, Illinois law grants no preemptive rights unless the articles specifically include them, so check your articles. This protection prevents majority shareholders from diluting your ownership percentage to diminish your influence.
Know your rights, protect your investment
Minority shareholder status does not mean that you are powerless in the face of the majority. Illinois law provides meaningful protections that can prevent oppression and ensure fair treatment. If you believe your rights are being violated, consulting with an experienced corporate attorney can help you understand your options and take appropriate action. Your investment deserves protection — and the law is on your side.]]>On Behalf of Storm & Piscopo, P.C.<![CDATA[Compensation Disputes: Are Majority Shareholders Overpaying Themselves?]]>https://www.stormpiscopo.com/?p=491452026-08-05T04:49:37Z2026-08-05T04:49:37ZFew things are more frustrating than watching your company grow only to be told there are no profits to distribute. Sometimes the explanation is buried in the compensation line items: majority owners increase their own salaries, bonuses or “management fees” to pull cash out of the company while avoiding dividends. This practice can create serious legal exposure and, for minority shareholders, be a sign of shareholder oppression.
Disguised dividends and excessive executive pay
A disguised dividend occurs when payments labeled as compensation actually function like profit distributions. The label matters less than the substance. If the company pays above-market compensation without a legitimate business reason, courts and arbitrators may treat those payments as improper self-dealing, a breach of fiduciary duty, or evidence of oppression depending on the governing law and the shareholder agreement.Those who are concerned that majority shareholders are unfairly taking portions of the business’s profits are wise to understand some of the most common ways majority shareholders can use compensation as a tool for unfairness. Red flags often include:
Large year-end bonuses paid to majority owners despite claims of flat performance or declining revenue
Sudden salary increases not tied to expanded duties or market benchmarks
“Consulting” or “management” fees paid to owner-controlled entities with vague invoices
Perks such as vehicles, travel or housing run through the company as business expenses
Claims of “zero profits” while cash flow remains strong and debt is not increasing
A sudden decrease or elimination of dividends/distributions
Any or a mix of these red flags warrants additional questions.
These practices can be a sign of shareholder oppression
Minority shareholders typically rely on distributions for a return on investment. When the majority divert earnings through inflated pay, the minority may be frozen out economically even while the business succeeds. That is a classic oppression narrative: the majority uses control to benefit itself at the expense of the minority, often paired with limited access to financial information or exclusion from decision-making.To evaluate whether compensation is excessive, counsel often focuses on practical proof points like industry compensation surveys and expert analysis of reasonable pay. This information, paired with additional evidence such as communications suggesting an intent to avoid distributions, can help to build a strong case for shareholder oppression. If successful, remedies may include repayment, damages, a court-ordered buyout or other equitable relief under Section 12.56 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act (805 ILCS 5/12.56).
Accountability is possible
If your co-owners are taking massive bonuses while insisting the company has no profits for distributions, you may be dealing with disguised dividends and potentially shareholder oppression. A careful review of compensation, governance, and financial records can clarify whether pay is legitimate or a mechanism to divert profits. Early legal advice can help preserve leverage, protect access to information and position you for a fair resolution.]]>On Behalf of Storm & Piscopo, P.C.<![CDATA[The “Business Divorce” Checklist: 7 Steps to Take Before You File Suit]]>https://www.stormpiscopo.com/?p=491462026-08-05T04:49:31Z2026-08-05T04:49:31ZA business partnership turns sour can be a stressful time for all the partners, However, it is important to focus on logistics and keep emotions under control. Before threatening to take a business partner to court, strategic steps can help to better ensure a favorable settlement instead of a protracted legal nightmare. Think of these steps as your pre-litigation battle plan — a practical guide to protecting your interests before heading to court.
Why preparation matters more than speed
In business disputes, the party who controls the evidence often controls the outcome. Rushing to file suit without securing critical documentation or understanding your legal and financial position can put you at a significant disadvantage. The following seven steps will help you build a solid foundation for whatever legal action lies ahead.
Your pre-litigation action plan
Step 1: Preserve all digital communications
There are many different triggers to business disputes. The moment you sense trouble brewing it is important to begin preserving evidence. Download and back up all messages, emails and any other digital communications related to the business. Cloud-based platforms can be altered or access can be revoked, so create offline copies stored in multiple secure locations. Only preserve records you are authorized to access — logging into a co-owner’s account or systems beyond your own credentials can create separate legal exposure. Remember, too, that preservation duties cut both ways: do not delete or alter anything, even material that seems unfavorable to you.
Step 2: Secure financial records and documentation
Gather all financial statements, tax returns, bank records, contracts, and operating agreements. If you do not have complete access, document what you can. This includes:
Corporate bank statements for the past three to five years
Accounts payable and receivable records
Expense reports and reimbursement documentation
Shareholder distributions and salary records
These documents form the backbone of any valuation dispute or claim of financial misconduct.
Step 3: Consider an independent financial audit
Before announcing litigation, consider hiring a forensic accountant to conduct an independent review of the company’s finances. This can uncover hidden assets, unusual transactions or financial irregularities that strengthen your position before you put the other side on guard. Retaining the accountant through your attorney can also help protect the analysis from disclosure.
Step 4: Document all verbal agreements and understandings
Write detailed memos to your attorney outlining any verbal agreements, promises, or understandings that were never formalized in writing. Include dates, witnesses, and specific details while your memory is fresh.
Step 5: Identify potential witnesses
Make a list of employees, vendors, customers, or advisors who have relevant knowledge. Note what each person likely knows, but let your attorney decide who contacts potential witnesses and when — informal outreach on your own can tip off the other side, create discoverable statements or invite accusations of interference.
Step 6: Review all governing documents carefully
Examine your operating agreement, shareholder agreement, partnership agreement, and bylaws with fresh eyes. Pay special attention to dispute resolution clauses, buyout provisions, and fiduciary duty definitions.
Step 7: Consult with experienced litigation counsel early
Before you take any irreversible steps, speak with an attorney experienced in business divorces. They can help you avoid common mistakes, develop a comprehensive strategy, and act as a buffer between you and the other side.
Moving forward strategically
Business divorces are rarely simple, but they do not have to be catastrophic. By taking these seven steps before filing suit, you position yourself to negotiate from strength and protect what you have built. Remember: in litigation, preparation often determines the outcome.]]>On Behalf of Storm & Piscopo, P.C.<![CDATA[A Dollar Isn’t Enough: Illinois Appellate Court Rejects Nominal Damages in Defamation Per Se Case]]>https://www.stormpiscopo.com/?p=491432026-07-13T18:20:19Z2026-07-10T16:06:03ZSullivan v. Schiman, 2026 IL App (3d) 250543 (filed July 7, 2026)
What is a reputation worth?
According to the Third District Appellate Court, when a
court finds you were defamed and actually harmed, the answer cannot be one dollar.
The Facts
Dr. William Sullivan, an emergency physician, performed a consented-to, chaperoned
rectal exam on a patient complaining of severe abdominal pain. The patient later
accused him of sexual assault. Police investigated; the State’s Attorney declined to file
charges. The patient then posted a graphic accusation on a community Facebook page,
warning residents that Dr. Sullivan had sexually assaulted her and urging people to stay
away from him and the hospital. The page’s administrator commented that he believed
the post, compared Sullivan to a local doctor who had actually been charged with a sex
crime, and pinned the post to the top of the page—where, by his own estimate, it
reached over 15,000 people.
Sullivan sued for defamation. After a four-day bench trial, the circuit court found the
assault never happened and that both the patient and the page administrator were liable
for defamation per se—the category of defamation so obviously harmful (here, false
accusations of a crime) that the law presumes damages. The court also found Sullivan
suffered real mental anguish: sleeplessness, humiliation, changes in temperament,
changes in how he practiced medicine.
Then it awarded him one dollar from each defendant.
The Ruling
The appellate court vacated the award. Its reasoning is a useful primer on how Illinois
law treats intangible harm.
Nominal damages, the court explained, exist for cases where a legal wrong occurred but
no meaningful loss followed. They are not a substitute for compensatory
damages—which are presumed in defamation per se cases. Where the trial court itself
found actual mental anguish flowing from a public accusation of violent sexual assault
seen by thousands, a one-dollar award was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The court acknowledged that reputational and emotional injuries resist precise
calculation—valuing them “more resembles art than arithmetic.” But difficulty of
measurement is not an excuse. In the panel’s words: “The law does not provide a
calculator for per se reputational injury, but neither does it permit the court to throw up
its hands and award a dollar.” Courts should weigh factors such as the nature, extent,
and duration of the injury, the breadth of publication, the severity of the accusation, and
the plaintiff’s mental suffering.
The court also reversed the denial of discovery sanctions. The page administrator had
denied five of six requests to admit—including that he made the post a “featured
post”—only to concede several of those facts at his deposition. The trial court refused
sanctions because they weren’t “appropriate at this stage of the game.” That, the
appellate court held, is not a criterion found anywhere in Rule 219(b), and the failure to
apply the rule’s actual criteria was an abuse of discretion.
Why It Matters
For anyone who posts—or shares—online. The defamation liability here didn’t
stop with the original poster. The page administrator who amplified the accusation,
vouched for it, and pinned it was independently liable. Sharing and promoting someone
else’s defamatory post carries real legal risk. Social media presents the opportunity for
the word of any person to be heard by an incomputable amount of people. What could
have been a post viewed by only a few people resulted in Schiman being found liable for
defamation per se, and could have resulted in the end of Sullivan’s medical practice and
livelihood.
For defamation plaintiffs and their counsel. This decision is strong authority that
a defamation per se finding plus evidence of actual anguish requires a meaningful
compensatory award. Corroborating testimony matters: Sullivan’s wife’s testimony
about his sleeplessness and changed demeanor featured prominently, even though he
never sought counseling or treatment. Additionally, the 15,000 calculation for the
amount of people that viewed the post does not represent the true reach of social media.
What social media views do not show. is the amount of people who heard about the
accusations from their friends, family, or co-workers who saw the post and showed them
or told them about it. People well outside the area where Sullivan lives could have seen
the post and may never know that he was later found not guilty. Thus, counsel must
urge the courts and juries reviewing similar cases to take a second and truly try to
comprehend how dangerous false accusations on social media can be, and to calculate
and award damages accordingly.
For litigators generally. Answer requests to admit carefully. Denials that later prove
false at deposition can support fee-shifting sanctions, and trial courts must evaluate
sanctions motions under the actual criteria of Rules 219(b) and 137—not general
impressions about timing.
The case now returns to the trial court to set a real damage award and to reconsider
sanctions under the proper standards.
This post is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. If you have
questions about defamation or protecting your reputation online, contact our office.]]>On Behalf of Storm & Piscopo, P.C.<![CDATA[Illinois Supreme Court Clarifies the Illinois Anti-SLAPP Test]]>https://www.stormpiscopo.com/?p=491382026-07-13T18:16:55Z2026-06-30T14:50:45ZWhen does a lawsuit cross the line from a genuine claim into a tool for silencing someone who
spoke up at a public hearing?
On June 25, 2026, the Illinois Supreme Court gave courts a
clearer way to answer that question under the state’s Citizen Participation Act (735 ILCS 110/1
et seq.) — Illinois’s anti-SLAPP law.
The short version: what matters is the plaintiff’s purpose in suing, not a checklist asking whether
the case is “meritless and retaliatory.” The Supreme Court said the second prong of the anti-
SLAPP analysis requires courts to determine “the plaintiff’s subjective intent in bringing the suit,”
rather than apply the rigid First District formulation that requires a defendant seeking the
protections of the Citizen Participation Act to prove the suit was both “meritless” and
“retaliatory.” Anderson v. Smith, 2026 IL 131714, ¶ 34.
What is a SLAPP?
A SLAPP — a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation — is a suit filed not necessarily to
win in the ordinary sense, but to silence critics and watchdogs with the cost, delay, and
distraction of litigation for exercising constitutionally protected political or petitioning rights. The
Court reiterated that SLAPPs employ “the threat of monetary damages and/or substantial
defense costs to either deter individuals from exercising their political rights or to punish them
for doing so.” ¶ 15.
Illinois enacted the Citizen Participation Act in 2007 to give targets of these suits a fast exit: an
early motion to dispose of the claim, a stay of discovery, a 90-day deadline for the court to rule,
and attorney fees for the prevailing movant. The Act sets out its purposes in section 5, including
balancing “the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury” with “the constitutional rights of
persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government.” 735
ILCS 110/5; ¶ 15.
How the case arose
The dispute in Anderson traces back to a 2017 press conference in a park, held before a public
hearing on a proposed hog-farming operation. Nicholas Anderson supported the measure;
Meagan Smith opposed it and stood holding a sign reading “farms, yes; factory farms, no.”
When Anderson approached her, Smith said, “I don’t know you” and “don’t touch me.” ¶ 3.
Smith told police Anderson had pushed her, and Anderson was arrested and later charged with
battery. He was acquitted after a bench trial in 2019. Anderson then sued Smith for defamation
and malicious prosecution. Smith counterclaimed and moved to dispose of Anderson’s suit
under the Act, arguing it was a SLAPP aimed at punishing her for opposing the hog farm and
reporting what she believed was a crime.
The trial court denied her relief, and the case worked its way up on the question of what legal
standard governs.
The split the Court resolved
Illinois courts apply a three-part, post-Sandholm test. The dispute in Anderson centered on the
second prong — whether the plaintiff’s claims are solely based on, related to, or in response to
the defendant’s participation in government.
The First District read the Supreme Court’s earlier Sandholm decision to require defendants
seeking the protections of the Citizen Participation Act to prove a suit was both “meritless” and
“retaliatory.” The Fourth District rejected that approach, calling instead for a “true goal” inquiry
into the plaintiff’s intent.
The Supreme Court sided largely with the Fourth District, holding that the “meritless and
retaliatory” standard “does not accurately reflect the Act and controlling precedent.” ¶ 1. The
Court explained that Sandholm merely used the phrase “meritless, retaliatory SLAPP” lawsuits
“as adjectives to describe SLAPPs, rather than as elements that a movant must prove.” ¶ 25.
Despite that clarification, the real question is subjective: is the true goal of the lawsuit to chill
participation in government, rather than to recover for genuine personal harm? The Supreme
Court framed the movant’s burden as requiring proof that: “the true goal of the lawsuit is to ‘chill participation in government or to stifle
political expression,’ rather than to seek damages for personal harm from the
defendants’ tortious acts.” ¶ 26.
How to bring a motion to dispose under the Act
The Act does not create a new, freestanding motion. A movant raises the Act’s immunity “in any
pleading filed to dispose of a judicial claim” — in practice, a motion to dismiss. 735 ILCS 110/10,
15. Because immunity under the Act is an “affirmative matter” that defeats the claim, the
Supreme Court has held that the proper vehicle is a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9)
of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9). The relief may also be sought within a
summary judgment motion, as the defendant did in Anderson.
Three features make the motion powerful, and each should shape how you draft and time the
filing:
• Fast track. The trial court must hold a hearing and rule on the motion within 90 days
after the respondent is given notice. 735 ILCS 110/20(a).
• Discovery freezes. Filing the motion suspends discovery; the court may permit only
limited discovery on whether the movant’s acts are immunized. 735 ILCS 110/20(b).
• A movant-friendly burden. If the movant shows that its acts were in furtherance of
participation in government and that the plaintiff’s claims are solely based on those acts,
the court must grant the motion and dismiss the claim unless the respondent produces
clear and convincing evidence that the acts are not immunized. 735 ILCS 110/20(c).
Two more points worth building into strategy. The Act is to be “construed liberally to effectuate
its purposes and intent fully.” 735 ILCS 110/30(b). And fees are not discretionary for a prevailing
movant: “The court shall award a moving party who prevails in a motion under this Act
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” 735 ILCS 110/25.
Finally, the denial of a motion under the Act is not the end of the road before trial. A party may
seek a permissive interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to dispose under the Act.
Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(9).
Two practical takeaways
A meritorious claim can still be a SLAPP
Because the focus of a Motion to Dismiss under Anderson must now be the purpose of the suit
and not necessarily its legal strength, a claim that could theoretically win on the merits may still
be dismissed — but only if the defendant carries the difficult burden of showing the plaintiff sued
solely to deter or punish participation in government. The Court said so directly: “A claim that
could theoretically succeed on the legal merits may therefore still be dismissed as a SLAPP,”
but only if the defendant shows the plaintiff brought it “solely to deter or punish the defendant for
participation in government.” ¶ 31.
Familiar signals like the timing of the suit or damages wildly disproportionate to the alleged harm
can still inform that intent, but they are no longer required elements. Likewise, whether a
complaint is legally weak may bear on the plaintiff’s intent, but “it is not a prerequisite to
satisfying the second prong of the test.” ¶ 31.
No evidentiary hearing
Here the Court parted ways with the appellate court. Trial judges must decide these motions on
the pleadings and supporting documents — including depositions taken before discovery was
stayed — not through a fact-finding evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing, the Court
reasoned, “is contrary to the Act’s suspension of discovery and its 90-day timeframe for a trial
court to rule on the motion.” ¶ 28. Instead, “the trial court must determine the plaintiff’s
subjective intent in bringing the suit from the pleadings and other supporting documents.” ¶ 30.
That matters procedurally. The motion is reviewed de novo, and if a genuine dispute over the
plaintiff’s intent remains on that record, the defendant has not met the burden and the motion
must be denied with prejudice.
The 2025 amendments change the focus going forward
There is an important catch to everything above: Anderson interprets the version of the Act that
applies to cases filed before January 1, 2026. The General Assembly has since rewritten the
very parts of the Act that Anderson relied on. Public Act 104-431 (eff. Aug. 21, 2025) amended
the Act and added a new applicability provision, but the changes reach only actions commenced
on or after January 1, 2026. 735 ILCS 110/32. The Court flagged this itself, limiting its analysis
to “cases filed before January 1, 2026” and noting the amendments are “inapplicable to the case
before us.” ¶ 1 & n.1. For those earlier cases, the purpose-focused analysis described above
still controls.
For newer cases, the amendments take aim at the very thing Anderson made central — the
plaintiff’s intent. Anderson built the second prong on two ideas drawn from Sandholm: that the
claim had to be “solely” based on the defendant’s protected acts, and that the court had to find
the plaintiff’s subjective “true goal” in suing. The amended Section 15 removes both. It now
states that a claim “does not need to solely pertain to the moving party’s constitutional rights”
and that the Act “applies regardless of the motives of the person who brought the claim.” 735
ILCS 110/15 (as amended by Pub. Act 104-431).
That reorients the motion. Rather than asking why the plaintiff sued — the subjective inquiry at
the heart of Anderson — a court applying the amended Act asks the more objective question
whether the claim is based on, relates to, or is in response to the defendant’s protected activity,
regardless of the plaintiff’s motive. In practice, that is an easier showing for the movant and
should make dismissal more readily available.
The amendments expand the Act in two other ways worth noting. They extend its protection to
“freedom of the press” (735 ILCS 110/15) — a response to earlier decisions that had read the
Act not to reach general news reporting — and they stay “all other proceedings,” not just
discovery, once a motion is filed.
What the amendments do not appear to change is how the motion is decided. They leave
Section 20’s machinery in place, so Anderson’s procedural rulings — that the motion is resolved
on the pleadings and supporting documents, without an evidentiary hearing, and reviewed de
novo — should carry forward. In short, the how of the motion looks stable; it is the focus of the
second prong that shifts, from the plaintiff’s purpose to the objective reach of the claim. One
caution: the amended Act is clearer about what the test is not (motive-based) than about the
framework that replaces it, so courts will need to fill in the contours, and it may take several
rounds of litigation before the post-2026 standard settles.
Bottom line
Anderson v. Smith shifts the Illinois anti-SLAPP inquiry away from a rigid “meritless and
retaliatory” formula and toward a focused look at why the plaintiff really sued — decided on the
papers, quickly, and reviewed fresh on appeal. Keep the dividing line in mind: that purpose-
focused analysis governs cases filed before January 1, 2026, while the 2025 amendments steer
later suits away from the plaintiff’s motive altogether. For anyone weighing a defamation or
related claim that touches on an opponent’s public advocacy, knowing which version of the Act
applies is now the first question to ask.
This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. For guidance on a specific matter, consult a licensed attorney.]]>On Behalf of Storm & Piscopo, P.C.<![CDATA[Meta Glasses/Secret Recording Devices]]>https://www.stormpiscopo.com/?p=491312026-06-29T16:02:27Z2026-05-27T15:00:56ZMeta Glasses/Secret Recording Devices
Ray-Ban Meta Glasses retail for around $500 and are becoming a popular way to record candid moments or “POV” (point-of-view) videos for social media apps like TikTok or Instagram. While in theory little more than a fun, handsfree way to shoot videos for social media, many worry about the privacy and security risks of the glasses due to their low profile. It is important for both Meta Glasses users - and people who may interact with users - to understand the laws surrounding surreptitious recording in Illinois.
Can I be recorded without my consent or knowledge in Illinois?
In Illinois, and the United States in general, individuals generally have the right to take photographs and/or make video recordings of anyone in public. In a public area, like the street, sidewalk, or at a park, Courts have found that individuals have no expectation of privacy, and therefore no protection from photographs or videos taken of them going about daily life.
One area where the law will protect your privacy is in terms of conversation. Illinois Criminal law prohibits “Eavesdropping,” or secretly recording a conversation you are a part of, or just overhear, without consent. Illinois is often referred to as a “two-party consent” state, which means that every party involved in the conversation must know, and further, must agree to the fact that the conversation is being recorded.
As long as both parties to the conversation are aware that their words are being recorded, and both choose to continue speaking, consent has been given. The principal remains the same for Meta Glasses, although the individual being recorded must be made aware – the small indicator light on the glasses would likely not suffice.
Times when you should leave the Meta Glasses at home
One major area where video recording should be avoided is inside of a courtroom.
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 44 specifically probits “televising” court proceedings in the state, with televising being defined as “the audio or video transmissions or recordings made by telephones, personal data assistants, laptop computers, and other wired or wireless data transmission and recording devices.”
In Illinois, the Courthouse you’re likely to go to for a traffic ticket or Family law hearing is a branch of one of Illinois’ 25 Circuit Courts. In addition to the Supreme Court Rules, each Circuit is empowered to make its own “Local Rules.” While the Local Rules may vary in some ways, nearly every Circuit will have a rule that specifically bans recording devices from the Courtroom.
In Kane County, the 16th Judicial Circuit, Local Rule 1.11 specifically prohibits any recording, be it photographic, videographic, or audio, in any courtroom, whether your hearing is in person or via an electronic means such as Zoom. DuPage County, the 18th Judicial Circuit, Local Rule 1.30 holds the same. Rule 1.30 even bans devices capable of recording from being on the premises, provided the device doesn’t have some other independent use, like a laptop or smartphone.
Penalties for violating these rules surrounding the recording of Court can be severe – including even jail time. Many rules allow a judge to punish unauthorized videography with Contempt of Court. In Lake County, the 19th Circuit, Judges are allowed to punish contempt with a fine up to $500 and/or jailtime up to 6 months.
Written by Colman Gillis – Law Clerk, [nap_names id="FIRM-NAME-1"]]]>by Storm & Piscopo, P.C.<![CDATA[Illinois Appellate Court Clarifies Trial Courts’ Power to Allow Amendments to Post-Judgment Motions]]>https://www.stormpiscopo.com/?p=491272026-06-29T16:39:28Z2026-05-06T15:00:01ZIn Owens v. Berkshire Nursing & Rehab Center, 2026 IL App (1st) 241662 (Apr. 28, 2026), the First District vacated two orders and clarified that trial courts retain jurisdiction to allow amendments to a timely filed post-judgment motion until that motion is decided.The case arose from the death of Tempie Owens, a nursing-home resident with severe hypothyroidism and dementia, whose estate alleged wrongful death, medical negligence, and Nursing Home Care Act violations against Berkshire Nursing & Rehab Center and a contracted nurse practitioner, Lory Arquilla-Maltby. A jury returned verdicts for both defendants, and the court entered a single judgment on August 8, 2023. Within 30 days, the plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion for a new trial focused solely on Berkshire and the Nursing Home Care Act claims . Afterward, the plaintiff sought leave to amend that motion to add evidentiary-error arguments pertaining to Arquilla-Maltby; the trial court denied leave, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because more than 30 days had passed from final judgment.The issue before the appellate court was whether the circuit court had jurisdiction and discretion to allow an amendment to a timely filed post-judgment motion before ruling on that motion, even if more than 30 days had elapsed from entry of final judgment.The appellate court held that the circuit court retained jurisdiction over the timely post-judgment motion and had discretion to permit an amendment until the motion was decided; by concluding it lacked jurisdiction, the court failed to exercise its discretion . Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the order denying leave to amend and, as a consequence, also vacated the order denying the motion for a new trial, remanding for the trial court to exercise its discretion on the amendment request.The opinion confirms that amendments to timely post-judgment motions are not “successive” motions and remain within the trial court’s discretion until the original motion is ruled upon, preserving flexibility to address additional issues without triggering jurisdictional bars. Because the trial court did not exercise that discretion here, further proceedings are required, and any renewed appeal may be expedited with potential adoption of prior briefs.Written by: Peter M. Storm]]>by Storm & Piscopo, P.C.<![CDATA[Trustee Disclosure Obligations]]>https://www.stormpiscopo.com/?p=491242026-07-15T14:23:24Z2026-04-28T08:15:34ZA recent unpublished Illinois appellate decision offers helpful guidance on what a trustee must disclose when a beneficiary asks for trust documents. In Lindblad v. Blair, 2025 IL App (1st) 241753-U, the court held that a trustee satisfied the disclosure requirement in 760 ILCS 3/813.1 by providing the beneficiary with the operative trust instrument—the most recent restatement of the trust. The Lindbad court further ruled, however, that the beneficiary was not entitled see prior drafts or amendments of the trust. Under the Illinois Trust Code, a qualified beneficiary may, upon reasonable request, obtain a complete copy of the trust instrument. See 760 ILCS 3/813.1. However, the court in Lindblad explained that this obligation does not automatically require production of prior drafts, superseded amendments, or earlier restatements when those documents have been replaced by the current governing instrument.The opinion is especially important for estate planning and fiduciary administration because it draws a practical line between ordinary disclosure obligations and a formal challenge to trust validity. The beneficiary in Lindblad argued that he needed earlier documents to investigate possible fraud or undue influence, but the court emphasized that he had brought only a declaratory action about disclosure rights—not a substantive challenge to the validity of the operative trust under provisions such as 760 ILCS 3/406. As a result, the trustee was not required to produce non-operative documents simply because the beneficiary wanted to explore a possible claim.The case also fits with the Illinois Trust Code’s broader emphasis on identifying and maintaining the governing trust instrument. Trustees must maintain, or cause to be maintained, a copy of the governing trust instrument for at least 7 years after the trust terminates under 760 ILCS 3/810. Together, these provisions reinforce that the trustee’s core disclosure duty centers on the current operative instrument, unless and until a specific validity challenge makes earlier documents relevant.For trustees, the ruling in Lindblad v. Blair is a useful reminder to maintain clear records and to respond carefully to beneficiary requests. It also illustrates why trusts should be reviewed and updated with precision: a well-drafted restatement can help define what governs and what no longer does.
]]>by Storm & Piscopo, P.C.<![CDATA[AI Conversations and the Attorney-Client Privilege]]>https://www.stormpiscopo.com/?p=491222026-06-29T16:14:01Z2026-04-17T15:58:43ZIn a recent case out of a federal trial court in the Southern District of New York, United States v. Heppner, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32697*, a client’s AI conversations were deemed unprotected by the attorney-client privilege.
What is the Attorney-Client Privilege?
The Attorney-client privilege is a foundational part of your legal representation. It is a privilege that you, as the client, own, that protects what you say to your attorney in private. The privilege is not absolute – as an example, your attorney would be obligated to break it if you tell your attorney that you intend to kill or do seriously bodily harm to someone, and what your estate-planning attorney may be able to relate what you told him or her if there is a challenge to your will. In most cases, however, what you say to your attorney will remain private, even after your death.Attorney-client privilege can be waived in some ways – particularly if the privilege’s owner (you, the client) discloses any of what you discussed with the attorney to another person. As the Illinois Appellate Court discussed in Ross v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., disclosing information to a third party is inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege, to keep what is said to one’s attorney private.United States v. HeppnerIn November 2025, Bradley Heppner was charged with securities fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and falsifying corporate records. Heppner’s conduct involved allegedly defrauding more than $150 million with the use of false representations of corporate documents. Following his arrest on November 4, 2025, the FBI executed a search warrant at his home. While conducting the search, the FBI seized documents and electronic devices from Heppner’s home. One of the seized electronic devices contained memorialized communications Heppner made utilizing the AI platform “Claude”.Heppner argued that his communication with the AI platform was privileged under the attorney-client relationship, as he was utilizing AI for outlining a “defense strategy” and legal analysis based on facts and law that were applicable to his case. He argued that he created the AI generated legal documents to have something to speak with his attorney about. However, Heppner generated this content on his own, without the knowledge or consent of his attorney.The government counterargued that AI generated material is not protected under the attorney- client relationship, and that Heppner’s actions had waived the privilege of confidentiality.The district court agreed with the government and allowed the communications with Claude to be admitted into evidence. Claude is not an attorney, and as the court in Heppner put it “the discussion of legal issues between two non-attorneys is not protected by attorney-client privilege.” The court also drew attention to the lack of privacy in communications with Claude,noting that the privacy policy on Anthropic’s website states that communications with their chatbots may be disclosed to third parties, even the government.
What does this mean for individuals in Illinois?
While a court in Illinois is not bound by the decision of United States v. Heppner, it is likely that if faced with the same facts, an Illinois court would come to the same conclusion. Clients should take caution before disclosing details of their case to AI chat programs.Information given to an AI chat program is not protected, and therefore obtainable by the other party in litigation. While the Court in Heppner did not hold that the talking to the AI was a complete waiver of the attorney client privilege, it did find that the information conveyed would remain unprotected, even if it was also discussed with the attorney.Beyond the legal ramifications, experts agree that there are serious privacy concerns with AI tools. Never upload any sensitive information like bank or medical records to an AI chatbot, as information put into an AI system like OpenAI’s ChatGPT becomes a part of its data set.
The Takeaway
AI Chat programs are not attorneys and cannot give anyone legal advice. Only licensed attorneys can offer legal advice and protection of Attorney-Client Privilege. At Storm & Piscopo, P.C., our trained team of attorneys can help with a wide variety of matters, and, unlike an AI platform, we will keep your information confidential in accordance with the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.Written by: Colman Gillis and David AguillarLaw Clerks – Storm & Piscopo, P.C.]]>On Behalf of Storm & Piscopo, P.C.<![CDATA[‘Undue influence’ and The New Caregiver Statutes]]>https://www.stormpiscopo.com/?p=491112026-07-15T15:49:03Z2026-03-02T18:00:35ZUnderstanding Illinois caregiver transfer presumptions
Illinois law may apply closer review to large transfers that benefit non-family caregivers. When a caregiving role begins before a major gift or inheritance, the Probate Act can create a rebuttable presumption against that transfer. The rule addresses periods of reliance rather than accusing anyone of wrongdoing.
If the transfer exceeds the statutory dollar amount and benefits a caregiver who does not qualify as a family member, the court does not cancel it by default. Instead, the law allows review of timing, relationship and dependence.
Late-life trust changes often appear during a narrow window. Health may decline. Daily help may increase. Social contact may also shrink. A caregiver may gain access to schedules, papers or private talks. No single fact shows undue influence. When viewed together, these details may support closer review under Illinois law.
You may see breaks from earlier planning choices. Long-time beneficiaries may drop out without explanation. Changes may occur close to illness or rising care needs. Illinois law allows courts to review context without assuming intent or outcome. This statutory approach differs from traditional undue influence claims by narrowing the focus.
Applying the rebuttable presumption of fraud in Kane County disputes
If your dispute arises in Kane County, courts generally apply the same caregiver statute used across Illinois. Local rules still control filings and hearings. Evidence shapes the review. The presumption may shift the burden of explanation to the caregiver rather than to you.
A caregiver may try to address that presumption by pointing to facts such as:
Independent involvement by a neutral advisor
Consistency with earlier estate planning choices
Limited authority over finances or daily decisions
Each point addresses influence and independence. Courts review timing, records and credibility.
What to consider after a late-life change
When a late-life change raises questions, the next step often involves reviewing records and noting timing and relationships. Knowing where Illinois law applies can add scrutiny and help you frame those facts more clearly. With that context, you can decide whether a closer review of the trust change makes sense for your situation.]]>
